What is Plato attempting to accomplish in the Laches? A cursory reading leaves one with the strong impression that the main topic of discussion is the education of the sons of Lysimachus and Melesias. However, an equally cursory survey of the major interpretations of the Laches reveals that few, if any, scholars agree with that impression. Their view is that the main topic of conversation in the Laches is courage, the examination of which takes place in the second (...) main section of the dialogue. On this view, neither the first half of the dialogue nor the concluding short section is philosophically significant since neither adds to the discussion of courage. What is left obscure on that view is what Plato is doing in these “insignificant” sections. In addition, that view does not help us to understand Plato’s emphasis on education throughout the dialogue. It seems, then, that the initial question has led to a second one: is the Laches a unity both philosophical, and philologically? Both of these questions are inextricably intertwined. The question of the unity of the Laches can be dealt with fully through a consideration of a unifying theme or argument, and the question of the integrating theme can be considered only in the light of the structure of the dialogue. I contend that a unifying thread of argument can be found in the Laches and that the traditional view of the dialogue results in cutting it into two parts having little philosophical or literary relation to each other. I propose, first, to show that the traditional interpretation is untenable, and second, to offer a counterinterpretation which avoids the necessity of regarding the first and concluding parts of the dialogue as philosophically insignificant and which provides a unifying theme. These two goals will be achieved in the following way: it will be shown that the assumption that the main conversation of the Laches is about courage implies the destruction of the unity of the Laches and leaves unclear what Plato is doing in the first half of the dialogue. And, second, a counterinterpretation will be offered showing that the central theme of the dialogue is the educational consultant. It will be shown that this theme unifies the dialogue, makes clear what Plato is doing in otherwise obscure passages, and puts into proper perspective the discussion of courage. We must now consider the traditional interpretation of the Laches. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Beauty, Transcendence, and the Inclusive Hierarchy of Creation1Thomas Joseph White, O.P.Interpreters of Thomas Aquinas have long argued about whether he holds that beauty is a “transcendental,” a feature of reality coextensive with all that exists, like unity, goodness, and truthfulness.2 In the first part of this article, I will argue that Aquinas can [End Page 1215] be read to affirm in an implicit way that beauty is a (...) transcendental. In the second part, I will consider what it might mean from a Thomistic point of view to speak of a transcendent divine beauty, given Aquinas’s metaphysical commitments, particularly with respect to his doctrine of divine simplicity. In the final part, I will treat the question of how the beauty of the creation both manifests and conceals divine beauty.Beauty as a Transcendental Feature of RealityAquinas does not list beauty as a transcendental term in texts on transcendental notions. Perhaps, then, one should simply exclude it from a responsible account of his teaching on this subject. However, at least two well-known texts should give us reason to pause before reaching such a conclusion. One is found in his Commentary on Dionysius’ Divine Names, chapter 4, lectio 5. The other is in his discussion of the beauty of the eternal Son of God in a discussion of the Holy Trinity in the Summa theologiae I, q. 39, a. 8.In the first of these texts, Aquinas is commenting on Dionysius. The extended text is analytically dense. Aquinas is discussing ways in which one might say that God is beautiful and in what ways one might not say so. I will return to his topic below. Here, however, it is pertinent to consider Aquinas’s discussion of the presence of beauty in all that exists. He makes six main points.3 First, all beauty comes [End Page 1216] from God insofar as God is the cause of all that exists. Second, he gives a first definition of beauty: beauty can be defined ontologically as the splendor (claritas) that results from form; everything has a formal determination of some kind insofar as it has existence (esse); therefore, insofar as anything exists (and has some formal ontological content) it has some degree of beauty. Third, the splendor of the form in created things is a participation in the divine splendor from which it originates. The divine nature is the transcendent exemplar of beauty in diverse finite created realities. Fourth, then (and perhaps most importantly), “ex divina pulchritudine esse omnium derivatur”: literally, the existence of everything originates from divine beauty. Fifth, a second definition of beauty is considered: beauty can be defined ontologically as a property of being that emerges from proportion or harmony (consonantia). For example, authentic relationships of personal friendship imply spiritual harmony or concord and are beautiful and noble in this respect. Sixth, then, the concord or beautiful harmonies we find in the created order are expressive of the wisdom of God, who is the author of creation.Evidently, if the existence of everything derives from divine beauty, and if everything that has existence is in some way beautiful by virtue of its intrinsic form, then it would seem to follow logically that beauty, for Aquinas, is a characteristic of being that is coextensive with all that exists. We see a similar idea expressed in the aforementioned passage of ST. Here, however, Aquinas gives a more synthetic definition of beauty in things that combines both the definitions found in our previous discussion, claritas and proportio, but it also adds a third, integritas: ontological integrity or wholeness.Species or beauty has a likeness to the property of the Son. For beauty includes three conditions, “integrity” or “perfection,” [End Page 1217] since those things which are impaired are by the very fact ugly; due “proportion” or “harmony”; and lastly, “brightness” or “clarity,” whence things are called beautiful which have a bright color.4The implication of this point of view is readily apparent. God is essentially beautiful, and God has created all that exists in light of the eternal Word and Wisdom of God, who is the Son. Consequently, all that exists and that... (shrink)

PurposeTo use the power of knowledge acquisition and machine learning in the development of a collaborative computer classification system based on the features of age-related macular degeneration (AMD).MethodsA vocabulary was acquired from four AMD experts who examined 100 ophthalmoscopic images. The vocabulary was analyzed, hierarchically structured, and incorporated into a collaborative computer classification system called IDOCS. Using this system, three of the experts examined images from a second set of digital images compiled from more than 1000 patients with AMD. Images (...) were annotated, and features were identified and defined. Decision trees, a machine learning method, were trained on the data collected and used to extract patterns. Interrelationships between the data from the different clinicians were investigated.ResultsSix drusen classes in the structured vocabulary were largely sufficient to describe all the identified features. The decision trees classified the data with 76.86% to 88.5% accuracy and distilled patterns in the form of hierarchical trees composed of 5 to 15 nodes. Experts were largely consistent in their characterization of soft, and to a lesser extent, hard drusen, but diverge in definition of other drusen. Size and crystalline morphology were the main determinants of drusen type across all experts.ConclusionsMachine learning is a powerful tool for the characterization of disease phenotypes. The creation of a defined feature set for AMD will facilitate the development of an IDOCS-based classification system. (shrink)

This study elicits a concern to show forth those elements in the theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas that can menaingfully engage with those trends in contemporary hermeneutical philosophy and theology that highlight the conditioned nature of human understanding. The main point of reference in this regard os the hermeneutical philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer. At the heart of this hermeneutical enterprise is Thomas's construal of the relationship between intellect and will, a relationship that can be described as one (...) of dynamic reciprocity. A dynamic interaction between intellect and will obtains in both their natural and graced operations. Hence, the title of this book, The Hermeneutics of Knowing and Willing in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. Some might be concerned that the notion of hermeneutics will import the spectre of relativism into Thomas's thought. By guiding the reader through Thomas's doctrine of man as made to the image of the Trinity, his Trinitarian theology, his Christology, and his treatment of grace, the theological virtues of faith and charity, and the Gifts of the Holy Spirit, the author shows how Thomas in fact offers us resources for a theological hermeneutics of objectivity. The criteria for this objectivity, so the author argues, are Trinitarian, Christological, Pneumatological, ecclesial, and Scriptural. It is to be hoped that this book will be read not only by those who have a particular interest in Thomas's theology but also by theologians outside of the Thomistic tradition, particularly those interested in hermeneutics. (shrink)

Is Naturalism Coherent? Naturalism is the philosophical orthodoxy of the late 20th and early 21st century. However, the content of naturalism is unclear. I aim to demonstrate that naturalism cannot be formulated coherently. I offer two main arguments. First, naturalism presupposes the unity of science thesis; but the unity of science thesis has come under serious attack. But even if the naturalist successfully entitles herself to the unity of science thesis, naturalism is still subject to an argument from incoherence. (...) First, I reconstruct naturalism as the conjunction of a methodological and ontological theme. The ontological theme of naturalism states that only those things truly exist which can be accounted for by physical science. The methodological theme asserts that “philosophy is continuous with science”. While this can be interpreted in different ways, it is often taken to state that philosophy should only make statements that can be countenanced by the standpoint of science. Second, I demonstrate that this common construal has the underlying tacit assumption of the unity of science. The unity of science claims that: the entities and laws of the special sciences can be reduced to a master science, commonly identified as physics. Third, I briefly rehearse two lessons from Fodor and Horgan. Fodor convincingly argued against the inter-level reducibility of special science laws to the laws of physics. Horgan´s argument starts with the observation that a sensible version of reductive physicalism has to be cashed out in terms of supervenience. He then goes on to argue that no available conception of supervenience captures the reductive ambitions of physicalism. Hence, the naturalist simply cannot entitle herself to an uncontroversial notion of the unity of science that is presupposed by naturalism. However, and fourth, even if the naturalist can establish the unity of science thesis, it is subject to an argument from incoherence. I take a cue from the coherence problem of the “empiricist criterion of meaning” in logical positivism, and apply it to the naturalist doctrine. The methodological commitment states that in philosophy only those claims can be made which are countenanced from the standpoint of the natural sciences. This is the standard for philosophical practice set by naturalism. And naturalism is itself a philosophical thesis. However, both commitments of naturalism fall short of this standard. The ontological commitment states that, in effect, the only things that really exist are those entities that are accepted and posited by physics. But this claim itself does not qualify as a piece of natural science since it transcends the bounds of what natural science investigates. Similarly, the methodological commitment cannot be countenanced from the standpoint of natural science. The claim that philosophical practice should only include statements that can be countenanced from the standpoint of natural science, is itself not a statement that is countenanced by natural science. Since this standard was set by naturalism qua methodological commitment, I conclude that naturalism turns out to be an incoherent doctrine. Bibliography Fodor, Jerry : “Special Sciences,” Synthese 28:2, 97-115. Horgan, Terence : “From supervenience to superdupervenience: meeting the demands of a material world,” Mind 102, 555-586. Quine, Williard v. O. : Word and Object, MIT Press. (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

The purpose of our study is to demonstrate through an array of three themes that the role of the thought of Epicurus is central throughout the works of Friedrich Nietzsche. In doing so, we are going to study several themes among which the duality between the Apollonian and the Dionysian, the Übermensch and finally décadence (as the word is used in French by Nietzsche) and which Nietzsche associates to Epicurus in his last period. Our theoretical proposal consists of saying that (...) there is a common thread of the Epicurean thought in the Nietzschean works that makes it an important source of inspiration throughout his works in order to build some of his main concepts. (shrink)

In this article, which is fourth in a series of six articles, I address the fourth concept of consciousness that the Oxford English Dictionary defines in its six main entries under the word consciousness. I first introduce this fourth concept, the concept of consciousness4. by identifying the previous three OED concepts of consciousness, which I have already discussed in this series of articles, and by indicating how that to which we make reference, respectively, by means of those three concepts (...) is related to the referents of the concept of consciousness4. I then address the latter concept more directly by pursuing for the remainder of the article where the OED's fourm entry leads. Among other things, I am led to consider two competing accounts of consciousness4 that figure prominently in the OED entry, namely the intrinsic, self-intimational account of William Hamilton and the inner-eye, perceptionlike account of John Locke. Both kinds of account are very much with us today. (shrink)

In this article, which is fourth in a series of six articles, I address the fourth concept of consciousness that the Oxford English Dictionary defines in its six main entries under the word consciousness. I first introduce this fourth concept, the concept of consciousness4. by identifying the previous three OED concepts of consciousness, which I have already discussed in this series of articles, and by indicating how that to which we make reference, respectively, by means of those three concepts (...) is related to the referents of the concept of consciousness4. I then address the latter concept more directly by pursuing for the remainder of the article where the OED's fourm entry leads. Among other things, I am led to consider two competing accounts of consciousness4 that figure prominently in the OED entry, namely the intrinsic, self-intimational account of William Hamilton and the inner-eye, perceptionlike account of John Locke. Both kinds of account are very much with us today. (shrink)

In this article, which is fourth in a series of six articles, I address the fourth concept of consciousness that the Oxford English Dictionary defines in its six main entries under the word consciousness. I first introduce this fourth concept, the concept of consciousness4. by identifying the previous three OED concepts of consciousness, which I have already discussed in this series of articles, and by indicating how that to which we make reference, respectively, by means of those three concepts (...) is related to the referents of the concept of consciousness4. I then address the latter concept more directly by pursuing for the remainder of the article where the OED's fourm entry leads. Among other things, I am led to consider two competing accounts of consciousness4 that figure prominently in the OED entry, namely the intrinsic, self-intimational account of William Hamilton and the inner-eye, perceptionlike account of John Locke. Both kinds of account are very much with us today. (shrink)

We consider weighted o-minimal hybrid systems, which extend classical o-minimal hybrid systems with cost functions. These cost functions are “observer variables” which increase while the system evolves but do not constrain the behaviour of the system. In this paper, we prove two main results: optimal o-minimal hybrid games are decidable; the model-checking of WCTL, an extension of CTL which can constrain the cost variables, is decidable over that model. This has to be compared with the same problems in the (...) framework of timed automata where both problems are undecidable in general, while they are decidable for the restricted class of one-clock timed automata. (shrink)

The objectives of this book are to provide a new translation of Plato's M eno together with a series of studies on its philcisophical argument in the light of recent secondary literature. My translation is based mainly on the Oxford Classical Text, 1. Burnet's Platonis Opera (Oxford Clarendon Press 1900) Vol. III. In conjunction with this I have made extensive use of R.S. Bluck's Plato's Meno (Cam bridge University Press, 1964). At critical places in the dialogue I have also consulted (...) A. Croiset's Gorgias, Menon (Bude text). My debt ~o two other sources will be clearly in evidence. They are E.S. Thompson's Plato's Meno (London, MacMillan 1901), and St. George Stock's The Meno of Plato (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1894). One of the greatest difficulties facing a translator is to achieve a balance between accuracy and elegance. Literal translations are more likely to be accurate, but, alas, they also tend to be duller. Free translations run into the opposite danger of paying for elegance and liveliness with the coin of inaccuracy. Another hurdle, for a translator of a Platonic dialogue, is posed by the challenge to maintain the conversational pattern and fast moving character of the discussion. This is easier where the exchang~s are short, but much more difficult where Socrates gets somewhat long-winded. (shrink)

Cet article propose d’étudier différentes commissions municipales de la vie nocturne à Lille. Depuis les années 2000, ces instances de concertation ont essaimé en France et dans d’autres États européens dans le but d’encadrer le déploiement d’une économie de la fête nocturne. À partir d’une enquête monographique menée depuis 2012, reposant sur des entretiens avec des professionnels de la nuit et des différentes institutions concernées (mairie, préfecture, police), des observations ethnographiques de ces commissions, et une analyse des archives municipales, nous (...) nous proposons d’esquisser une généalogie de ces instances de concertation en mettant de côté la recherche de ses effets sur l’action publique au profit de l’étude de ses usages et _in_ _fine_ de ses fonctions latentes. Notre perspective diachronique nous permet de tester l’hypothèse éliassienne d’une forme de « curialisation » de la vie nocturne. Ces espaces de délibération constituent un moyen pour la mairie de prendre pied dan... (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty: From Perspective to the Chiasm,the Epistemic Rigor of an AnalogyHere, we wish to take up the discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of chiasm in light of the question of its status. Is it a matter of a metaphor without any cognitive value resulting from an analogical and arbitrary transfer from one domain to another, or is it a matter of a rigorous concept susceptible of being experimented upon, taken up again, or improved? If the latter is the case, what is (...) the nature of this concept? Is it descriptive, heuristic, or even logical? The question is worth asking insofar as it is not only the most orthodox positivists who may be likely to see, in this transfer of concept, nothing more than poetic license. Indeed, the most careful commentators authorized by Merleau-Ponty are in lockstep with the critics of his supposedly “literary” style. “Ambiguous” is thus the term, which more often describes Merleau-Ponty’s notions of encroachment, of reversibility, or even chiasm. First, we shall examine the function and the role of the concept of chiasm in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. We shall then establish its scope in order to be able to determine its exact status. It is only at the conclusion of this study that we will be able to show how this notion sheds light on Merleau-Ponty’s main concern, namely, to produce a counter-model of perspective and to promote a newcategory of relation – a concern which organizes the seemingly unrelated elements in his philosophy.Merleau-Ponty: dalla prospettiva al chiasma,il rigore epistemico di un’analogiaIntendiamo riprendere, in questa sede, la discussione sulla nozione di chiasma in Merleau-Ponty, alla luce di una domanda circa il suo statuto: si tratta di una metafora, priva di ogni valore cognitivo perché nata da un trasferimento analogico ed arbitrario da un campo semantico ad un altro, o si tratta di un concetto rigoroso, suscettibile di essere messo alla prova dell’esperienza e via via perfezionato? In tal caso, qual è la natura di questo concetto? È descrittiva, euristica, oppure logica? È interessante porre questa domanda dato che non sono solamente i positivisti più ortodossi, a vedere in questo trasferimento una semplice licenza poetica. In effetti, molti tra i commentatori più autorevoli di Merleau-Ponty aderiscono alle diverse critiche sollevate intorno alla presunta natura «letteraria» di questa espressione, e ritengono che il chiasma sia una semplice metafora. Interrogheremo innanzitutto la funzione e il ruolo di questo concetto nella filosofia di Merleau-Ponty al fine di determinarne l’esatto statuto. Solo al termine di questo studio preliminare potremo mostrare come questa nozione possa gettare nuova luce sulla preoccupazione principale di Merleau-Ponty, vero e proprio filo rosso che organizza in profondità tutti gli elementi apparentemente eterogenei della sua filosofia: vale a dire, il tentativo di produrre un contro-modello della prospettiva e una nuova categoria di relazione. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty: From Perspective to the Chiasm,the Epistemic Rigor of an AnalogyHere, we wish to take up the discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of chiasm in light of the question of its status. Is it a matter of a metaphor without any cognitive value resulting from an analogical and arbitrary transfer from one domain to another, or is it a matter of a rigorous concept susceptible of being experimented upon, taken up again, or improved? If the latter is the case, what is (...) the nature of this concept? Is it descriptive, heuristic, or even logical? The question is worth asking insofar as it is not only the most orthodox positivists who may be likely to see, in this transfer of concept, nothing more than poetic license. Indeed, the most careful commentators authorized by Merleau-Ponty are in lockstep with the critics of his supposedly “literary” style. “Ambiguous” is thus the term, which more often describes Merleau-Ponty’s notions of encroachment, of reversibility, or even chiasm. First, we shall examine the function and the role of the concept of chiasm in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. We shall then establish its scope in order to be able to determine its exact status. It is only at the conclusion of this study that we will be able to show how this notion sheds light on Merleau-Ponty’s main concern, namely, to produce a counter-model of perspective and to promote a newcategory of relation – a concern which organizes the seemingly unrelated elements in his philosophy.Merleau-Ponty: dalla prospettiva al chiasma,il rigore epistemico di un’analogiaIntendiamo riprendere, in questa sede, la discussione sulla nozione di chiasma in Merleau-Ponty, alla luce di una domanda circa il suo statuto: si tratta di una metafora, priva di ogni valore cognitivo perché nata da un trasferimento analogico ed arbitrario da un campo semantico ad un altro, o si tratta di un concetto rigoroso, suscettibile di essere messo alla prova dell’esperienza e via via perfezionato? In tal caso, qual è la natura di questo concetto? È descrittiva, euristica, oppure logica? È interessante porre questa domanda dato che non sono solamente i positivisti più ortodossi, a vedere in questo trasferimento una semplice licenza poetica. In effetti, molti tra i commentatori più autorevoli di Merleau-Ponty aderiscono alle diverse critiche sollevate intorno alla presunta natura «letteraria» di questa espressione, e ritengono che il chiasma sia una semplice metafora. Interrogheremo innanzitutto la funzione e il ruolo di questo concetto nella filosofia di Merleau-Ponty al fine di determinarne l’esatto statuto. Solo al termine di questo studio preliminare potremo mostrare come questa nozione possa gettare nuova luce sulla preoccupazione principale di Merleau-Ponty, vero e proprio filo rosso che organizza in profondità tutti gli elementi apparentemente eterogenei della sua filosofia: vale a dire, il tentativo di produrre un contro-modello della prospettiva e una nuova categoria di relazione. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty: From Perspective to the Chiasm,the Epistemic Rigor of an AnalogyHere, we wish to take up the discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of chiasm in light of the question of its status. Is it a matter of a metaphor without any cognitive value resulting from an analogical and arbitrary transfer from one domain to another, or is it a matter of a rigorous concept susceptible of being experimented upon, taken up again, or improved? If the latter is the case, what is (...) the nature of this concept? Is it descriptive, heuristic, or even logical? The question is worth asking insofar as it is not only the most orthodox positivists who may be likely to see, in this transfer of concept, nothing more than poetic license. Indeed, the most careful commentators authorized by Merleau-Ponty are in lockstep with the critics of his supposedly “literary” style. “Ambiguous” is thus the term, which more often describes Merleau-Ponty’s notions of encroachment, of reversibility, or even chiasm. First, we shall examine the function and the role of the concept of chiasm in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. We shall then establish its scope in order to be able to determine its exact status. It is only at the conclusion of this study that we will be able to show how this notion sheds light on Merleau-Ponty’s main concern, namely, to produce a counter-model of perspective and to promote a newcategory of relation – a concern which organizes the seemingly unrelated elements in his philosophy.Merleau-Ponty: dalla prospettiva al chiasma,il rigore epistemico di un’analogiaIntendiamo riprendere, in questa sede, la discussione sulla nozione di chiasma in Merleau-Ponty, alla luce di una domanda circa il suo statuto: si tratta di una metafora, priva di ogni valore cognitivo perché nata da un trasferimento analogico ed arbitrario da un campo semantico ad un altro, o si tratta di un concetto rigoroso, suscettibile di essere messo alla prova dell’esperienza e via via perfezionato? In tal caso, qual è la natura di questo concetto? È descrittiva, euristica, oppure logica? È interessante porre questa domanda dato che non sono solamente i positivisti più ortodossi, a vedere in questo trasferimento una semplice licenza poetica. In effetti, molti tra i commentatori più autorevoli di Merleau-Ponty aderiscono alle diverse critiche sollevate intorno alla presunta natura «letteraria» di questa espressione, e ritengono che il chiasma sia una semplice metafora. Interrogheremo innanzitutto la funzione e il ruolo di questo concetto nella filosofia di Merleau-Ponty al fine di determinarne l’esatto statuto. Solo al termine di questo studio preliminare potremo mostrare come questa nozione possa gettare nuova luce sulla preoccupazione principale di Merleau-Ponty, vero e proprio filo rosso che organizza in profondità tutti gli elementi apparentemente eterogenei della sua filosofia: vale a dire, il tentativo di produrre un contro-modello della prospettiva e una nuova categoria di relazione. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Afterword to the Polish Edition of Thomistic EvolutionA Catholic Approach to Understanding Evolution in the Light of Faith by Nicanor Pier Giorgio Austriaco, O.P., James Brent, O.P., Thomas Davenport, O.P., and John Baptist Ku, O.P.*Mariusz Tabaczek O.P.Translated by Monika Metlerska-Colerick[End Page 225]Thomistic Evolution: A Catholic Approach to Understanding Evolution in the Light of Faith, by Nicanor Pier Giorgio Austriaco, O.P., James Brent, O.P., Thomas Davenport, O.P., and (...) John Baptist Ku, O.P., is an intriguing attempt at a comprehensive approach to the question of theistic evolutionism from the perspective of Thomistic tradition. The breadth of the approach offered by the authors, starting with the problem of the relationship between reason and faith and subsequently reaching to the foundations of the philosophy of nature, natural theology, and theology of creation, as well as biblical exegesis, provides an appropriate introduction and background for the analysis of a thesis suggesting that it is possible for God to create new species of living organisms (including the Homo sapiens sapiens species) through the processes of evolution. The comprehensible manner in which the discussed questions are presented renders the book accessible to a wide audience.Although one should agree with the main thesis formulated by the authors of Thomistic Evolution regarding the possibility of God expressing his creative power through the emergence of new species of living beings by way of evolution, it also has to be noticed that the arguments they present do not always take fully into consideration certain significant difficulties that arise along the way and the resulting necessity to broaden and adjust the ideas of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition to present-day standards in order for it to engage in a dialogue with contemporary science. In the absence of such broadening and adjusting, one might arrive at an overly simplified view of things in which St. Thomas himself would easily come to agree with the main assumptions of theistic evolutionism. Our aim, thus, is to reveal a more profound level of the complexity of the debate regarding the Thomistic view of creation and evolution.St. Thomas and EvolutionismOn the one hand, Brent's intuition seems justified that the Thomistic definition of creation as being dependent on God in existence (depicted in chapter 7) is compatible with both the image of the world in which various kinds of species are immutable and the image of the world in which they are subject to change. On the other hand, we cannot forget that St. Thomas himself perceived forms of species as permanently fixed in the moment of the first member of a given species coming into existence and—consequently—not being subject to any future alterations. Hence, reproduction, according to Aquinas, serves as a continuation of species without the introduction of any significant variations: "Nature produces like from like. Now the thing generated is like its generator in [End Page 226] species and form. Therefore the form is produced by the action of the generator and not by creation" (De pot., q. 3, a. 8, sc 4).This quotation from Questiones disputatae de potentia points us towards the theological question of creation. Here, we must emphasize that, according to St. Thomas, at its origin, the world was perfect as to the number of created species. Hence, "something can be added every day to the perfection of the universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as to the number of species" (ST I, q. 118, a. 3, ad 2).1 It is true that Aquinas allowed for the arising of new animal species through putrefaction caused by the power of the sun, as well as through the crossbreeding of already existing species (see ST I, q. 73, a. 1, ad 3, a portion of which is quoted by Austriaco in chapter 24). However, the emergence of new forms of animal organisms in this way by no means implies or anticipates the theory of their descent from a common ancestor by way of evolutionary transformation. Nor is it a manifestation or expression of the most basic rules governing nature, but rather an exception and a departure from their regularity... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:CRUCIFIXION: ACCIDENT OR DESIGN? Sebastian Moore, O.S.B. Downside Abbey Lastyear I was visited by an old friend from my Liverpool days. Mike and I had worked together with the young of the parish, and one summer the two of us took a couple of boys camping in France, a trial of patience which made us known to each other at some depth. He was in fact a passionately convinced (...) Catholic, and very pastoral with it. We had many and long theological discussions. On his recent visit to Downside, I was showing him and some friends round our church, when, à propos ofquite what I don't remember, he made a remark about the Catholic cult of suffering, and said, "and it's all because ofthe crucifixion, isn't it? Why don't we recognize that the crucifixion was an accident?" I didn't react, because I was dumbfounded at what seemed to be the denial ofthe mystery ofthe cross by a friend who I had no reason to believe had stopped being a Catholic. And I'm sure he hasn't. He would certainly have told me ifhe had. It has taken me over a year to figure out what is going on here, and this would not have been possible without intensive study of the work of René Girard. The only alternative to saying that the crucifixion was an accident is to say that it was "ordained by God." It is only as ordained by God that this horrible event could be presented to people as a divine affirmation that suffering is to be sought and espoused. Also, it is only as ordained by God that the crucifixion can be thought of as "appeasing God" in some way. Both the moral and the dogmatic implication ofthe crucifixion—that suffering is a good thing, and that God required a victim—are grounded in the notion that God required the crucifixion ofhis Son. And it is because this idea is quite unacceptable, unworthy of God and ofthe human mind made in God's image, that my friend concludes that the crucifixion was not required by God, not written into the eternal scheme ofthings, but an accident. 156Sebastian Moore Once the problem is clarified in these terms, more and more instances come to mind, of rejection, by Christians and others, of the whole divine ordination ofthe cross. Gore Vidal refers to Christianity as "that lugubrious religion." Mary Hunt, a prominent American Catholic feminist, introduced a workshop with the statement, "we are not about naked guys nailed to crosses, blood all over the place!" Where divine ordering is accepted the special painfulness and darkness ofthe idea is noted. Anselm refers to the doctrine as the Narnia Chronicles, to commend the notion, by referring to a dark law written into the nature ofthings beyond our comprehension. The children's suggestion that Asian should simply not comply with the Snow Queen's requirement is rejected by Asian with a mysterious impatience—the children justhaven't grown up, like the romantics who, according to Matthew Arnold, "did not know enough." Again, during a day on "the roots of violence" that I led here yesterday there was much questioning about the role ofGod die Father in the crucifixion. The problem is crystallized in the famous cry from the cross, "Why have you forsaken me?" To my confessedly lame suggestion that Jesus was "only quoting a psalm," someone remarked, "to quote that psalm at thatjuncture and not mean it, is somewhatmisleading!" Again it's the same problem. How can God be understood as ordaining the crucifixion, compatibly with the notion of God as all-loving which Christianity of course affirms? Hans Urs Von Balthasar, who is 90% pro-Girard, in the other 10% wants to hold on to something he calls "the wrath of God." Thus the seeming necessity of having God require and ordain the crucifixion is the main crisis of Christian belief. The six-year-old Willie, in Thomas Klise's amazing novel, The Last Western, puts the problem with childlike directness. He keeps interrupting catechism class with, "Why did God kill Jesus?" and is shushed by Sister. I recall that Illtyd Trethowan said to... (shrink)

Since the turn of the millennium, theologians and secular scholars of religion have increasingly begun exploring the relationship between transhumanism and religion. However, analyses of anti-transhumanist apocalypticisms are still rare, and those that exist are situated mainly among broader explorations of religious and secular bioconservatism. This article addresses this lack of specificity by drawing analyses of transhumanism and religion into dialogue with explorations of contemporary demonology through a close study of the beliefs of the evangelical conspiracist Thomas Horn and (...) the anti-transhumanist milieu around him. Exploring the milieu's multifaceted demonology of the secular world in light of genealogies of religion and secularity, the article situates Horn's demonology as one attempt to negotiate these genealogies, using what Sean McCloud terms a “‘supernatural’ hermeneutics of suspicion” that sees spiritual forces as the structural base of reality. It argues that, while fringe, milieus like Horn's illuminate broader cultural tensions and genealogical relations surrounding the place of religion in a secular world. (shrink)

This article is a reply by the author to John Deely’s book review “How to Go Nowhere with Language: Remarks on John O’Callaghan, Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn” (ACPQ vol. 82, no. 2). Its main topics are: (i) Deely’s view that, for Aquinas, the concept is distinct from the act of understanding, (ii) John of St. Thomas’s use of mirror images as a metaphor for how concepts work in cognition, and (iii) the sign relation posited by Aristotle (...) that stands between words and concepts of the mind. (shrink)

New essays by leading philosophers explore topics in epistemology, offering both contemporary philosophical analysis and historical perspectives. There are two main questions in epistemology: What is knowledge? And: Do we have any of it? The first question asks after the nature of a concept; the second involves grappling with the skeptic, who believes that no one knows anything. This collection of original essays addresses the themes of knowledge and skepticism, offering both contemporary epistemological analysis and historical perspectives from leading (...) philosophers and rising scholars. Contributors first consider knowledge: the intrinsic nature of knowledge—in particular, aspects of what distinguishes knowledge from true belief; the extrinsic examination of knowledge, focusing on contextualist accounts; and types of knowledge, specifically perceptual, introspective, and rational knowledge. The final chapters offer various perspectives on skepticism. Knowledge and Skepticism provides an eclectic yet coherent set of essays by distinguished scholars and important new voices. The cutting-edge nature of its contributions and its interdisciplinary character make it a valuable resource for a wide audience—for philosophers of language as well as for epistemologists, and for psychologists, decision theorists, historians, and students at both the advanced undergraduate and graduate levels. Contributors Kent Bach, Joseph Keim Campbell, Joseph Cruz, Fred Dretske, Catherine Z. Elgin, Peter S. Fosl, Peter J. Graham, David Hemp, Michael O'Rourke, George Pappas, John L. Pollock, Duncan Pritchard, Joseph Salerno, Robert J. Stainton, Harry S. Silverstein, Joseph Thomas Tolliver, Leora Weitzman. (shrink)

These two volumes are the first extensive study of the influence of Marsilio Ficino on major English poets. Ficino lived in Florence, Italy from 1433 to 1499. He introduced Plato to the Renaissance by his translations of the philosopher's complete works with detailed commentary. He wrote important works on astrology, a multi-volume work on Platonic Theology, and hundreds of brilliant public letters on a variety of subjects.

A synodal church makes assumptions about our basic ecclesial experience which takes place when we assemble liturgically, especially when we act eucharistically. The basic assumption is that we are a genuine human community knowing and relating to one another as brothers and sisters in baptism. Only real communities can authentically image the church's nature. This is a ‘bottom – up’ activity. If we wish this, then we must rediscover our liturgy and celebrate it in a new way as flowing out (...) from a community and helping it to discover its own nature. This, in turn, makes demands on our understanding of ministry and its structures. While many Catholics endorse synodality, their willingness to change the shape of the presbyterate is uncertain. (shrink)

This book is focused on what stabilizes and unifies our second nature, or that which we participants in a culture share in common. The claim is that in the triadic structure of the experience of all persons, trust is the key to the solidarity and stability of our second nature.

_"Clarissa" on the Continent _defines and explores two strategies of literary translation—creative vs. preservative and strong vs. weak—as they transform one of the most influential English novels. Thomas Beebee compares the two opposing strategies as they influence the French translation of _Clarissa_ by the novelist Antione François de Prévost and the German translation by the Göttingen Orientalist Johann David Michaelis, and in doing so he demonstrates that each translator found authority for his procedure within the text itself. Each translation (...) is also examined in light of Richardson's other writings and placed in its literary and cultural context. This study uses translations in order to interpret _Clarissa_, to show how the basis for the novel's reception on the Continent was laid, and to explore the differences and interactions among three literary and cultural systems of the eighteenth century. The close examination of these two important translations enable the formulation of not only a theory of creative vs. preservative translation but also the interconnections between literary theory and translation theory. Beebee also looks at later translations of _Clarissa_ as products of literary and historical change and at Prévostian strategies of the novel. (shrink)

_"Clarissa" on the Continent _defines and explores two strategies of literary translation—creative vs. preservative and strong vs. weak—as they transform one of the most influential English novels. Thomas Beebee compares the two opposing strategies as they influence the French translation of _Clarissa_ by the novelist Antione François de Prévost and the German translation by the Göttingen Orientalist Johann David Michaelis, and in doing so he demonstrates that each translator found authority for his procedure within the text itself. Each translation (...) is also examined in light of Richardson's other writings and placed in its literary and cultural context. This study uses translations in order to interpret _Clarissa_, to show how the basis for the novel's reception on the Continent was laid, and to explore the differences and interactions among three literary and cultural systems of the eighteenth century. The close examination of these two important translations enable the formulation of not only a theory of creative vs. preservative translation but also the interconnections between literary theory and translation theory. Beebee also looks at later translations of _Clarissa_ as products of literary and historical change and at Prévostian strategies of the novel. (shrink)

In this book, Professor McGarity reveals the complex and problematic relationship between the 'regulatory reform' movements initiated in the early l970s and the United States' federal bureaucracy. Examining both the theory and application of 'regulatory reform' under the Reagan administration, the author succeeds in offering both a relevant analysis and critique of 'regulatory reform' and its implementation through bureaucratic channels. Using several case studies from the early Reagan years, this book describes the clash of regulatory cultures resulting from the President's (...) attempt to incorporate 'regulatory analysis' into the bureaucratic decision-making process. Yet while McGarity recognizes the limitations of regulatory analysis, he concludes with suggestions for enhancing its effectiveness. This book could be used not only as a textbook for political science and government courses but also for graduate applications in public policy and public administration. (shrink)

Self-Knowledge: An Essay in Social Personalism proposes that social Personalism can best provide for self-knowledge. Thomas O. Buford offers a social personalist understanding of self-knowledge which focuses on the relation of persons to each other and to the Personal, and avoids the impersonalisms that erode the dignity of persons and their moral life which characterize modern life.

Committed to the metaphysical thesis that Person is first, working within the Liberal Protestant Consensus, and believing that our minds are capable of grasping reality, Boston Personalists have followed two roads in developing their thought: ratio and poeisis. The former is represented by Bowne and Brightman with their emphasis on reason, and the latter by Bertocci with his emphasis on creativity. Though Bowne and Brightman were deeply concerned with education, it was Bertocci who wrote on the subject, and his focus (...) was on moral education. My interest, however, is not in developing Bertocci's position. Rather I shall state the essentials of a Personalist view of moral education within the poeisis tradition. To do that I shall address this question: "Must one know to be good?" I shall discuss that question by examining the life of the developing moral person and the place of knowledge in that life. As this discussion unfolds, we shall see the educational ideal of Boston Personalism. (shrink)

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